The present article proceeds from the observation that the therapeutic relationship is basically unequal. This inequality essentially concerns the respective situation of the patient and his or her doctor vis-a-vis medical knowledge. A strict professionalism guarantees that this inequality remains factual and without essential value. Yet, ifboth partners unreflectively allow affectivity excessively to intrude into their relationship, their behaviour may then be inspired by subconscious, rather than rational, motives. In that case, the unverifiable allegations ofphilanthropy or paternalism may be used to rationalise a kind of'medical sadism' which attempts to justify the will to humiliate the patient by means ofthe constraints inherent in medical care. The concept ofethical form is introduced as a non-verbal criterion ofethical reliability. It is mainly a way oftraining the will through the application ofrationally justified rules ofbehaviour.
In this context, it is suggested that an effort to remain constantly within the limits ofprofessionalism represents a method oftrainingfor the achievement ofsome degree of ethical credibility in the therapeutic relationship. In the long term, such abstinence could constitute a sort of catharsis, and thereby help to reveal the non-rational motives in medical behaviour. Contrary to the belief prevailing in modern society, the established limits of medical knowledge are not so broad. The application of these limits would probably be the best method of preventing emotions from interfering undesirably in the therapeutic relationship.
The current protests against 'medical power' tend to contrast medical technology with the ability to communicate. Sometimes, the former is regarded as a possible source of contempt for the patients. The purpose of this paper is to suggest, in direct opposition to the prevailing trend, that the process of development of an optimally technical approach could ensure an ethical basis for the practice of medicine.
Let me begin with two observations which could probably be documented without too much trouble, but will be stated rather dogmatically, as simple
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premises. The first is that the dispenser and the recipient of medical care are engaged in a fundamentally unequal relationship. In a world which regards disease as a regression and death as the ultimate evil, how can these two individuals relate as equal? The patient maybe suffers incomprehension; is physically, mentally or psychically diminished; experiences pain or anticipates it. As E D Pellegrino writes, the patient 'suffers what is nothing less than an ontological assault' (1). The physician is said to know; is required to exercise a competence; is not suffering; and is entitled to prescribe, forbid, touch, penetrate -even mutilate. As a result ofthis basic inequality, the patient is 'forced to place himself under the power of another person' and is in 'a state of wounded humanity'. No honest approach to medical ethics can disregard this problem. Let me make the second observation, before surveying the consequences of the first: Western medicine is violent and thus offensive for the patient. The word 'violent' is not aimed at giving unnecessary offence: it means only that quite often, medicine is a potential source of harm -or pain. Giving an injection, the most trivial medical event, is a considerable corporal aggression -having regard especially to the usual norms of non-violence which prevail in social behaviour today, at least theoretically. As to tests referred to as 'non-invasive', their pathogenicity is often suspected -or even known: x-rays are the archetypal illustration of this, but present debate over ultrasonography shows that nothing can safely be assumed safe (2) . Is it necessary even to mention drugs, with their inexorable side-effects (3)?
It is useful to emphasise that, up till now, my remarks have not Incidentally, I want to point out that it does not follow from denying that the patient is a spontaneous source of demand that he can be said to be treated against his wishes. In effect, between the extremes of spontaneous demand and actual constraint, there is the middle ground of plain consent. Thus, the point is to examine the nature of the offer. Consider the many remedies that are 'offered' by fringe medicine for overweight, impotence or cancer. Few doctors would disagree that they raise thorny ethical questions. But consider now whether the countless offerings with which academic medicine increasingly affects our lives have greater credibility. Exactly what scientific grounds underlie the large-scale medical enterprises I mentioned above? So what does it mean to say that a demand is 'spontaneous', if the person requiring treatment has, by a cultural mystification, been encouraged to develop false expectations? What is the impact of the constant incitement to expectation which results from exaggerated claims about the depth and reach of medical knowledge? Surely one who demands treatment consents to it; but if the patient has been misled into overconfidence, there can be no informed consent.
Thus, the cases against contemporary medical interventionism could clearly be developed on pure scientific grounds. The issue at stake is that of the validation ofmedical knowledge. For example, there is a striking contrast between the amount or frequency of nutritional recommendations or prescriptions on the one hand, and the huge scientific uncertainties which persist concerning even elementary mechanisms or consequences of obesity, on the other (4). And, for obvious linguistic reasons I prefer to spare my reader a diatribe against sexology -even on pure scientific grounds. ... When scientific papers show that our diagnoses may be false as often as in 50 per cent ofcases (5), or when researchers may ask whether we are losing the war against cancer (6), we should return to an attitude of professional humility and expend our energy on improving our technical procedures rather than aiming at more intrusion into the lives of people.... 2. Limits of the patient-physician interaction I have followed two apparently disparate lines of thought. First, I have evoked the patient and his suffering in the therapeutic relationship; then, I have gone on to question the reliability of medical knowledge -especially its relevance and its significance. The two problems are intimately intricated, and of primary importance for a professional ethics.
In medicine, as mentioned above, technical necessities result in a situation based on an inequality of knowledge and a violence of procedures. This inequality and this violence -factual in themselves -create optimal conditionsfor a drift ofthe therapeutic relationship into a situation of medical sadism. Sadism begins when mutual or unilateral pleasure (perhaps subconscious) tends to prolong or aggravate the constraints ofmedical care beyond the limits which can be justified by pure technical or scientific considerations. Thus, the fundamental question of medical ethics is, in my opinion: how to prevent an inequality of fact from becoming a moral (or essential) inequality?
In a country like France, it is difficult to be a 'progressive' doctor today without acknowledging some degree ofdiscipleship in respect of Balint (10, I 1). A number of our contemporaries are confident that a Balintian approach enables them to avoid the pitfalls of medical power.
Apart from whatever reservations Balint's thinking might itselfelicit, one may question how and why it has become fashionable. In the mundane realm of everyday life, there is no self-contained idea of static validity: any evaluation of philosophical or other creative work needs to be dynamic -in this case, historically based. What was the impact of Balint's ideas at the time of their publication? I do not presume to make a definitive analysis, but there can be no doubt that the post-war period was a time of great enthusiasm for technology and that Balint's work, focusing as it did on the irrational tenor of a one-to-one relationship, ran counter to the current opinion that chemistry and pharmacology promised remedies for the major ills of humanity. Balint can therefore be said to have led at the time a protest movement.
And today? I do not think that Balint's ideas, locked in a remote historical setting, have kept their potential for generating critical questions. In conformity with a classic outcome in 'l'histoire des mentalites' (when identical ideas may be applied to opposite purposes according to the cultural context), I believe on the contrary that these ideas may now emerge from the cracks in today's medical power to prepare for that of tomorrow. Indeed, our environment has changed in the last forty years: the dominating way of thinking is no longer submitted to a triumphant technology. Therapeutic research is stagnating; as a sign of the times, demographers wonder whether the decline of the rate of mortality may be coming to an end (12) . Unable to provide new technological answers which people have understandably come to expect, medicine is side-tracking the problems. Far from admitting its (perhaps transient) incompetence, it is turning to the Psychic or even the Spiritual. What a transformation this is! Here I am not seeking to revive the ancient dichotomy of mind and body. I am simply observing that our academic medical training is based on the body, and that transferring one's attention to the mind after reaching an impasse with the body is covering up one form of ignorance with another. In this strategy, the theories of Balint (which amazingly circumvent the question of the psychological training of physicians) furnish a formidable weapon. Therefore, I see no evidence of any progress being made in this psychological drift: where is the dissident threat, this time, in these once unorthodox ideas? Their most evident potential now is to preserve medical power by masking its failures.
In contrast, all the great minds of medicine have perceived the asymmetry and risk inherent in the therapeutic relationship, and have made a point of mapping out the boundaries of their art sharply. The end result is that a patient cannot be asked to surrender both psychically and physically: one or the other must be chosen. Power over body and soul is precisely the province of God alone 'who fathoms the loins and the hearts'. It is not here a question of religious belief: the point I want to raise is why some modern prescriptions tend to transpose to a social relationship what the collective imagination has for a long time seen as the reason and power of divinity. For us simple mortals, the acquisition of human maturity seems manifested by the ability to attain cognisance of the other as an integral being who remains at a certain distance. The divine prerogative that those who make a profession of treating illness claim, could correspond to overestimation or emotional immaturity more than to great charity. If it is necessary to choose in a medicine traditionally oriented towards the care of the body, the sexual chastity which is usually required for the physicians could represent a prototype and training -a paradigm -for a more complex form of reserve: an emotional and intellectual chastity. And the fundamental question of medical ethics becomes: how to establish with precision the distance to which a patient is entitled in order to feel respected and recognised?
The extent of our scientific knowledge or technical power provides us with an upper bound ofwhat can be done with a patient. In medicine it is probably not acceptable to do whatever is technically possible; but it is surely immoral to aggravate the constraints of medical care beyond what is scientifically justified. By carefully delineating the area of possible relationships with patients -as the domain of reliable validated knowledge -and by appreciating the patient's autonomy and his right to privacy, we could set clear limits beyond which we would agree not to go. By restraining ourselves, and possibly by diverting the disastrous request of a patient in perdition, we might convince ourselves that two beings remain separated by an unencroachable gap. Coming to grips with the irreducibility of others means accepting that the patient is not a site for the crystallization of egoistic fantasies but is a whole 'object' in the psychoanalytic sense, and end-in-himself in a Kantian sense.
Discussion
The present paper is nothing more than a suggestion for further reflection; it does not claim to solve every problem of medical ethics. One evident difficulty lies in my proposition of reappraising the concept of technical expertise, which is basically imprecise: in medicine, there is no consensus on what is scientifically validated, and what is not. The present debate over carcinogenicity of oestrogens is a paradigm of this sort of difficulty (13, 14, 15) : is the corpus of knowledge about the pill sufficient to subject millions ofwomen to a risk perfectly known -or not?
Nevertheless, continuously reassessing, objectively and uncomplacently, the breadth of his validated knowledge in order to determine to what extent he can and should respond to a patient's requirements represents for the physician a challenging exercise in ethics. More: an ethical training. Let us call form a means for training the will towards the progressive acquisition of a certain spiritual state: a precise and well delimited performance to be engaged repetitively, similar to those which have been constantly called for by philosophers (like Epictetus or some mystics) more concerned with action than with talk in ethics. Even before Freud instituted the 'era of suspicion', it has always been known that words are not adequate proof of the authenticity of moral feelings. In ethics, forms are required by the necessity of a shift from the subjectivity of verbal allegations towards more objectivity: one is not moral alone...
As guarantors for the content, ethical forms are twofold: in medicine, for example, they concern the two partners of a transaction, namely the patient and his doctor. For the patient the definition of an area of validated knowledge and the certitude that interaction with the physician will not go beyond these limits, is a kind ofprotection. The objectivity ofthe process lies in particular in the fact that the physician could be questioned about the practical consequences of his actions and that -possibly -his answers could be checked. It is one thing to ask a woman about her sexual life (as priests did in the past -at least in Latin countries (16) . . .); it would be another to explain to her with some degree of precision what kind of influence her answer will have on her treatment.. But ethical forms are also a guarantee for the physician himself. Indeed, many papers on medical ethics seem to consider that inappropriate moral actions will harm the patient only. From a moral standpoint however, a physician may be essentially damaged by his ethical errors. To lack intellectual or moral chastity with patients, to be content with their objective inferiority, is to prevent oneself from acquiring more humanity and maturity: that is to stagnate in one's innate sadism.
Of course, the technical model proposed here has potential dangers: that of a dehumanisation of medicine, for example. But even in the present state of the art, this risk exists already. If I had to be treated by a sadistic physician, I would prefer to be in a situation severely restricted on scientific ground rather than left to his free will, as would be the case now.
Moreover, it is not true that technicality necessarily implies a dehumanisation of medicine. On the contrary, excessive intrusion in the life of people is likely to fit with bad science. For my part, I perfectly agree with A R Feinstein that good science (or technique) could permit a re-humanisation of medicine, for example by restoring attention to crucial, but 'soft' clinical data, which can be managed today with reasonable rigour and standardisation (17, 18) . Henceforth, the challenge for a physician is to be human as a technician (or a scientist), not as a priest. . .
A major objection against any paper like this one could be that scepticism about the possibility of philosophical medical ethics which was ironically outlined by R Gillon: 'it's all too subjective' (19) . Firstly, despite its subjectivity, an ethical reflexion furthers rigorous analysis of the issues at stake; this analysis may be of interest even for those who reject its ethical presuppositions.
Secondly, I would like to emphasise that modern medical interventionism itself is by no means morally neutral. Two of its moral prejudices are easily recognisable:
-a view ofillness as fundamentally bad, and ofdeath as the ultimate evil.
-a strong positivism, characterised by a good deal of optimism about the breadth, significance and reliability of medical knowledge.
Thus we have to convince ourselves that questioning modern medicine on moral grounds does not represent an (out-of-date) fight of Philosophy against Science: simply a confrontation between an explicit and an implicit ethics. Thirdly, it is illusory to believe -as Pellegrino does -that it is possible to propose a professional ethic 'prior to (. . .) a fairly wide range of value system', ie independently of any philosophical commitment. We have not one ethic as physicians, another as parents, another as believers or atheists, another as citizens, and so on. We have, or we have not an ethic, and as Seneca remarks somewhere in his Letters, the best criterion for a moral philosophy is the ability of its followers to live accordingly in a constant, consistent and convincing way. For a professional ethics, to have a general philosophical derivation is not a flaw, but the hallmark of a high standard -and a prerequisite for internal consistency.
In medicine, technical necessities impose an inequality of skill and a violence of procedures; as such, they may act as rationalisations of a medical sadism. The natural dynamics of unequal situations is a spontaneous tendency towards worsening.
It is illusory or presumptuous to believe to be possible the assessment of the genuine motivations ofa person: allegations of moral sincerity are essentially irrefutable. That does not mean, however, that relational transactions are confined to a savage confrontation of subjectivities, since subjectivity expresses itselfby the means ofsocial acts which can be tested or subjected to some kind of verification. One major ethical duty of social life should be to make as objective as possible the subjective content on which social acts are founded, in such a way that others could have some indication ofthe authenticity ofthe motives.
A shift like this could be named a process of objectivation; an ethical form is the process of objectivation of a moral subjectivity. The aim of social life is not to believe (or to make others believe) any kind of subjective allegations; it is rather to ask for (and to give) as many proofs of authenticity as possible.
Too often, in medicine, the concept of trust is perverted -and acts as a means of alienation: it is not the duty of a patient to take the physician's word for it. As there is no possibility of checking the doctor's sincerity, it is useful and even necessary to assess the reliability of the technical necessities governing his action. As an ethical form, the concept of technical expertise needs to be reappraised: if medical prestige has the value of Science in modern society as its main origin, then it should be normal to question most of the medical attitudes on scientific grounds.
From then on, the risk of seeing the patient's objective inequality transformed into a humiliating situation would decrease -if not vanish. It is important, in effect, to remark that inequality is not, in itself, negative. For people (physicians included), an illness can be an important spiritual experience: that of the limitation of one's autonomy, for which the help of another human being may be required. Inescapable as it is, this request may be a positive experience of selfknowledge which depends on a firm definition of the respective roles and mutual distances.
